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Reply Arguments
1. The Findings and Conclusions of the Trial Court Support
an Award of the Unis' Attorney's Against the Ohs.
The Ohs' claim that the Urns have failed to "marshall the evidence" to support a
challenge of the Trial Court's refusal to award the Urns a judgment of attorneys fees against
the Ohs fails to point to any finding of fact or conclusion of law which the Urns are
allegedly challenging. Findings of fact marshalled by the Ohs to support the judgment of
the Trial Court to refuse an award of attorney to the Urns are also marshalled to overcome
the Trial Court's dismissal of all the Ohs' claims against the Urns and the specific finding
that the Urns prevailed over the Ohs. The findings relied upon are not sufficient to
accomplish either purpose.
Further, while claiming that the Urns have failed to marshall the evidence in favor
of the Trial Court's findings of fact, as required by Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v.
Neale, 776 P2d 643 (Utah App. 1989), hereinafter Mountain States /, the Ohs fail to point
out which findings of fact are being attacked by the Urns as clearly erroneous. The reason
for this is that the Urns have challenged none of the findings of fact of the Trial Court.
Because the Urns are challenging the judgment and none of the findings, this Court may
apply a "substitution of judgment" standard of review of the Trial Court's legal reasons, if
any, for denying the Urns an award of attorneys fees against the Ohs. Unless overcome by
a clear marshalling of the evidence in opposition to a particular finding, the written findings
of fact of the Trial Court are to be accepted as valid, regardless of any oral statements from
the bench by the Trial Court varying or interpreting those findings; and regardless of any
interpretation which the Ohs wish to place upon those findings.
Although Utah R.App.P. 11(e)(2) requires that a transcript of all evidence relevant
to a challenged finding or conclusion be included in the record on appeal, this Court has
1

i

squired such marshalling where the challenge is a legal one. In Saunders v Sharp, 806

P2d 198 (Utah 1991), this Court overturned an affirmation of judgment by flic* <"<nm of
Appeals for appellant's failure to marshal the evidence with the following analysis:
If a challenge is made to the findings, an appellant must marshal all evidence
in favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then demonstrate that
even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court below, the
evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact. If the appellant fails to
marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record supports
the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the
lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case.
Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Scharf v.
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
However, the court of appeals erred when it then automatically
affirmed the judgment based on plaintiffs' failure to show the findings of fact
to be unsupported. An appellate court is to review the trial court's
conclusions of law for correctness. Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d
1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). Once the findings of fact (rather than the judgment)
were affirmed by the appeals court, it was then incumbent on that court to
review the trial court's conclusions of law and its application of the law to the
facts as found. -Saunders, 806 P2d at 199
Unlike Saunders, the Ums are not disputing of the findings of fact, but they are
disputing the correctness of the conclusions of law made based upon those factual findings,
particularly with regard to the trial court's application of the law to the facts found in this
case.
The Court of Appeals, in Campbell v Campbell, 896 P2d 635 (Utah App 1995) has
recently relaxed the marshalling requirement when the findings of fact are legally
insufficient to support a judgment, holding that". . . appellants need not engage in a futile
marshalliiig exercise if they can demonstrate the findings, as framed by the court, are legally
insufficient." Campbell, 896 at 638. Here, as in Campbell, the findings of the trial court are
legally insufficient to suppor ( the ultimate judgment denying the Ums any recovery against
the Ohs.
While attacking the Ums' failure to marshal! the evidence in support of their
2

argument for an award of attorney's fees against the Ohs, the Ohs have failed to
acknowledge the specific finding of fact of the Trial Court that: "With the dismissal of third
party Plaintiffs' action against them with prejudice, third party Defendants have prevailed
against third party Plaintiffs" (Supplemental Findings, Kl Findings of Fact); and also ignores
the Trial Court's conclusion of law that: "Pursuant to paragraph 15 of the uniform real
estate contract, third party Defendants [the Ums] are entitled to an award against
Defendants and third party Plaintiffs [the Ohs] of all their costs and reasonable attorneys
fees incurred in defending this action.
Granting that the Trial Court did not view the Ums' entitlement to an "award" as
rising to a right to judgment against the Ohs, it was the liability of the Ohs to the Ums,
under the Assignment of Contract from the Ohs to the Satsudas, that the Trial Court found
that the Ums' "award" entitled them to judgment directly against the Satsudas
(Supplemental Findings, WI 3 and 4 of Conclusions of Law). It is this inconsistency which
the Ums are attacking as a question of law, not of fact, to which legal conclusion of the
Trial Court this Court need give no deference. The issue before this Court is, does such
a logical inconsistency between the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment rise
to an abuse of discretion sufficient to overturn the Trial Court's denial of an award of
attorneys fees?
2. Ums Are the Prevailing Party
The Ohs' citation to Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P2d 553 (Utah
App. 1989), hereinafter Mountain States II, for the proposition that determining a prevailing
party in litigation is often difficult, and that the record does not compel a finding that Ums
are the prevailing party merely because the Ohs' complaint was dismissed on all counts, is
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sorely misplaced. In fact, Mountain States /, 776 P2d 643, 648, stands for the proposition
that a complete nonsuit of a plaintiff determines the defendant as the prevailing party:
Typically, determining the "prevailing party" for purposes of awarding
fees and costs is quite simple. Plaintiff sues defendant for money damages; if
plaintiff is awarded a judgment, plaintiff has prevailed, and if defendant
successfully defends and avoids an adverse judgment, defendant has prevailed.
However, this simple analysis cannot be employed here because both plaintiff
and defendant obtained some monetary relief against the other. Our review
of the relevant case law convinces us that under the provision at issue, there
can be only one prevailing party even though both plaintiff and defendant are
awarded money damages on claims arising from the same transaction,
[citations omitted]. We hold that in the present circumstances the party in
whose favor the "net" judgment is entered must be considered the "prevailing
party" and is entitled to an award of its fees, [citations omitted].
This Court in Mountain States II, 783 P2d 553, 554 was not quite so absoh ite when,
according to the Ohs, it "expressly rejected the mechanical application of the 'net judgment
rule' for determining who is the prevailing party in any particular case", stating:
We recognized in footnote 7 of our opinion and here emphasize "the
need for a flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in particular cases who
actually is the prevailing party." Consistent with that view, we point out that
nothing in our opinion should be taken to suggest that the net judgment rule
can be mechanically applied in all cases, although it will usually be at least a
good starting point.
In this case we remain convinced that application of the net judgment
rule does not distort the relative success of the parties at trial, as seen from
two additional perspectives implicit in Mountain States' petition.
There is no split decision here. The Ohs' complaint was dismissed on all counts and
with prejudice. Ilie only finding of fact by the Trial Court on the issue is Supplemental
Finding of Fact no. 1, which is specific that the Urns prevailed over the Ohs. The Ohs rely
upon their Amended Conclusions of Law to somehow eviscerate the Urns' successful
defense; but the only relevant paragraphs in the Amended Conclusions of Law are nos. 9
& 10, which state, "9. For the same reasons, the Defendants have failed to establish their
causes of action in their Third-Party Complaint. 10. Consequently, no cause of action is
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found on either the complaint or the Third-Party Complaint." The tie-in language asserting
that the Urns' successful defense is found only upon the dismissal of the Satsudas'
Complaint is contained within 112 of the Trial Court's First Amended Order. That order is
not a finding of fact. More relevant is Supplemental Conclusion of Law no. 2, recited
above, which is explicit that the Urns are entitled to an award of their defense fees and costs
against the Ohs.
Conclusion
Relying upon the findings and conclusions of the Trial Court, the Urns need not
marshall any evidence to challenge the conclusions of the Trial Court. In fact, the Ohs
various assertions and interpretations of the findings in this case are best ignored where the
explicit findings fail to make the statements or carry the implications claimed.
With the dismissal of the Ohs' third-party action with prejudice, the Urns are the
prevailing party. The findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case, as well as the case
law cited by the Ohs, contrary to their assertions, make it clear that the dismissal of all
allegations of a complaint with prejudice is a bright-line rule for determining that the
defendant is the prevailing party in such litigation.
Having been awarded judgment for their attorneys fees and costs against the Satsudas
based upon their prevailing against the Ohs and being "entitled to an award against" the
Ohs, it is illogical to allow the Urns' judgment against the Satsudas stand without making
the Ohs jointly and severally liable for these same fees and costec
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of December, 199o.

LfeiU-.— &2_

Spphen R. Smith, Jr.
Attorney for Appellees/Cross-Appellants
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